Car parts you can verify on-chain.

This page runs the real Veymark system. Not a video, not a mockup.

Today a fake brake part passes the same test as a real one: a QR code anyone can photograph and reprint. Veymark puts a chip on the part that proves it is genuine without ever revealing its secret, and registers every part on Solana at the factory.

Scroll down and follow one part from the factory to a buyer’s hand: the tag getting its secret, the passport minted on-chain, a phone checking it, and three ways to try to fool it. All three fail.

The only thing simulated is the plastic tag, because physical tags are not in our hands yet. The cryptography, the database, the replay check and the Solana transactions are live. Everything you trigger below runs in production.

Scroll to start

Inside the factory

Step 1

The operator signs in

The factory panel is not open to anyone. A session is a random token, and only its hash is stored — a stolen database hands an attacker nothing they can sign in with. Cutting someone off is deleting one row, and it takes effect on their next request.

Veymark

Factory panel

Password

Sign inSigned in

Session tokenonly its hash is stored

Step 2

Products are registered once

Before any tag is written, each product goes into the catalogue: model, category, description. It is done once, not on every part.

Each manufacturer only ever sees their own catalogue. Every lookup is tied to who is signed in, so changing a number in the address bar never opens somebody else’s list.

CatalogueDemo Auto Parts

Shock Absorber XR-40Suspension

Wheel Bearing RM-12Bearings

Headlight Bulb H7Lighting

Another manufacturer

No access

Step 3

The run is set, the tag is read

Product and batch are picked once at the start of the shift. Entering them again on every unit is where mistakes come from, and a wrong batch follows that part for the rest of its life.

After that the operator types nothing. The tag is held to the reader and its number arrives on its own.

That number is burned into the chip when it is made. It is printed nowhere and entered by nobody, so a wrong digit can never tie a real key to the wrong part.

Provisioning

ProductShock Absorber XR-40

Batch2410-A

Tag number— — — —04A7F2C13B9E60

Run readyReading the chipChip read

Step 4

The part gets a secret, then it is sealed

A key is created for this one part and no other. It goes inside the chip, and this is the only moment it can ever be read. From then on the chip proves it knows the key without handing it over.

Before the key reaches the database it is encrypted with a master key kept somewhere else entirely. Someone who steals the whole database gets rows that decrypt to nothing.

That is what stops a leak from becoming forged parts. Without the key, nobody can produce a reading the system will accept.

Key

In the openSealed

9f3c71a0e28b4d6510c7fa82b35e9d41••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Generated for this partAES-256-GCM

Not stored yetEncryptingSaved, unreadable

Step 5

The part gets its passport on Solana

A public record is created for this part: who made it, which batch, and when. Anyone can check it in a block explorer, without asking us and without trusting our site.

Every single part gets its own record. On Solana that costs a fraction of a cent, which is what makes it possible for a $200 shock absorber and not only for luxury goods.

The moment it was created is written into the chain and cannot be rewritten later.

Part passport

ModelShock Absorber XR-40

Batch2410-A

Made byDemo Auto Parts

Confirmed on Solana devnet

4sMtpP8hkicYvakQ9Bi1wYt9zBvdvq…

Step 6

Where the label goes, and what is inside

The screen says written or stop before the operator picks up the label. If it were unclear, a real part could end up with a tag the system never recorded, and it would fail every check from then on.

A battery is a closed box. The tag proves the box is real, but not what is inside it, so the label is stuck over the gap between the lid and the box. To open the box you have to tear the label, and a torn label stops working.

The cell and the board inside have tags of their own, recorded as belonging to this battery. If someone swaps the cell, the new one is not in the record.

Writing the tag

Tag written

Stick it over the gap

The label covers the gap

Opened — the label is torn

Each part inside has its own tag

The part leaves the factory

It carries a chip nobody can copy and a record nobody can rewrite. From here on, everything depends on whether a buyer can tell.

Now follow it to a workshop

Out in the field

In the field · 1

The part reaches a workshop

A box arrives. Inside is a shock absorber that looks exactly like the real thing, because a good copy always does.

The mechanic has no way to tell. The packaging can be reproduced, the printed code can be photographed and reprinted, and the part itself gives nothing away until it fails.

This is the moment everything before it was built for.

In the field · 2

A phone is held to the tag

No app, no account, no wallet. The phone is held near the part and the browser opens on its own.

The chip answers with a code it has never produced before. Every tap is different, so a code captured once is worthless the second time.

Nobody has to be taught anything, and nobody has to trust the person selling the part.

Hold the phone near the partThe chip answersThe browser opens on its own

In the field · 3

The answer, in seconds

The maker’s name comes first, not ours. That is the name the buyer already trusts, and the one a counterfeiter is pretending to be.

Model, batch and date are there to be compared against the invoice and the box in the buyer’s hands.

When a tag does not check out, the screen says it could not verify — never that the part is fake. A damaged tag and a forged one look identical to software, and accusing an honest buyer is the worse mistake.

Part verified for

Demo Auto Parts

Authentic part

Chip verified

PartShock Absorber XR-40

Batch2410-A

Made18 Sep 2026

Public record confirmed on Solana

In the field · 4

Proof you do not have to take on trust

The record lives on Solana, not on our servers. Anyone can read it in a block explorer without our site being involved at all.

That matters because every other link in this chain asks you to trust somebody. This one does not.

Run a real check below. It builds a tap with the same cryptography a chip uses and sends it through the live endpoint.

Your turn — check a real part yourself

This runs against production: a real tap, real cryptography, and the same endpoint a physical tag would reach.

A passport minted on devnet

4sMtpP8hkicYvakQ9Bi1wYt9zBvdvqnm…

That was the honest path

Everything so far assumed nobody was attacking. Three attacks follow, and every one of them runs for real against the live system.

Now try to break it

Try to fool the system

Attack 1

Copy a reading and use it again

Someone watches a genuine part being checked and keeps the exact data it produced. Then they send it again, for a different part.

The signature on it is perfect — it came from the real key. Nothing about it is forged.

It still fails. Each reading carries a counter that only moves forward, so a reading is worth one use.

Reading 1Accepted

Same reading, againRejected

Attack 2

Build a fake tag with the right number

The tag number is not a secret. Anyone can read it off a genuine part with any phone, then put that same number on a tag of their own.

What they cannot copy is the key inside the chip. It never leaves the chip and never appears on any screen, so they have to sign with a key they made up.

The reading arrives with the right number and a signature that matches nothing we ever issued.

NumberCopied

KeyMade up

Attack 3

Use a real chip the factory never issued

These chips are sold openly. Anyone can buy a box of them and write their own keys — the cryptography inside is genuine.

It changes nothing. A key only counts if a manufacturer created it, on the line, for a part that exists.

And notice what the screen says: not recognised — never fake. A damaged tag looks identical to software, and calling an honest buyer a counterfeiter is the worse mistake.

Real chipBought openly

In our recordsNever issued