Proof of silicon
Every genuine NXP chip carries a factory signature the phone checks on the spot, with no server in the loop. A cheap clone fails here before anything else runs.
Every authenticity label on the market can be defeated with a camera and a printer. Veymark puts a cryptographic chip on the part and its passport on Solana. The secret never appears on any screen, so there is nothing to photograph.
State 01
The part is genuine.
The chip answers with a code it has never used before, and the browser confirms the silicon is real NXP. The manufacturer's name is the one you trust — not ours.
veymark.xyz/v/8f2c…
HOLD NEAR PART
Part verified forFremax
Authentic partNXP silicon verifiedFirst verification of this code
PartBD-4718
Batch24-B
Made2026-04-11
How do we know it's authentic? ›
Sealed by VeymarkState 02
We can't confirm it.
A damaged tag and a fake tag look the same to software. So we never say counterfeit. We say we don't know, and we send you to the channel the counterfeiter doesn't control.
veymark.xyz/v/8f2c…
HOLD NEAR PART
Could not verify
This tag matches no record. It may be a damaged tag or a product that was never registered. This does not confirm the product is fake.
Confirm through the manufacturer's official channel.
Contact the manufacturer
Sealed by VeymarkState 03
The chip is real. The pattern isn't.
Same code, two cities, twenty minutes apart. The cryptography passed, so someone holds the genuine part — and someone else holds a copy. The manufacturer needs to know which.
veymark.xyz/v/8f2c…
HOLD NEAR PART
Unusual verification
This code was verified in another region minutes ago. That can indicate a copy or a diversion in distribution.
PartBD-4718
Batch24-B
Today 14:02São Paulo, BR
Today 13:47Curitiba, BR
Aug 12Factory
Report to the manufacturer
Sealed by VeymarkAbout
Every proof of authenticity on the market can be defeated with a camera and a printer.
QR codes, serial numbers, holographic seals — all of them are things you can see. Anything you can see, you can photograph. Veymark puts a secret inside the part that never appears on any screen, and proves it exists on every single tap.
Proof of touch
Each tap produces a code the chip has never produced before. A copy of a previous tap is already dead on arrival.
Proof in the open
The record sits on Solana. Anyone can read it in a block explorer, without trusting our site — or a cloned one — and check it against the manufacturer's public wallet.
What we don't claim
We will never tell you this is impossible to fake.
Any screen in the world can be cloned visually — your bank's, a watchmaker's, ours. What we remove is the easy attack: photograph and reprint. What's left is building a parallel fake ecosystem — own site, own tags, own distribution. That is expensive, traceable and prosecutable, and no system in any industry eliminates it. It is fought with official channels and criminal courts, not engineering.
Anyone promising you perfection is selling you the next thing that gets copied.
Why us
Twenty-two years inside the problem.
One of our founders spent 22 years at GM Brazil building new cars: sourcing parts, running the lab, signing off on quality. Ask him about counterfeit parts and he doesn't quote a statistic. He names the supplier, the batch and the failure.
The other half of the team builds on Solana. That combination is the whole reason this is a security product and not a collectibles product: a fake bearing doesn't cost a brand its margin. It costs someone their car at speed.
The questions worth asking.
A genuine NXP chip carries a factory signature the phone checks before anything else runs, so a cheap clone fails immediately. Cloning the silicon itself means fabricating authentic NXP parts — that is not a counterfeiter with a printer, that is a semiconductor operation. And even then, each tap must produce a code that has never been used; replaying a captured one fails.
No, and we won't say it is. Someone can build a parallel fake ecosystem: their own site, their own tags, their own distribution. No system in any industry removes that. What we remove is the easy attack — photograph the label, reprint it — which is how counterfeit parts are authenticated today. What's left is expensive, traceable and prosecutable.
A database works until the question becomes 'who do I trust to run it'. A manufacturer verifying against our private server is trusting us; a buyer verifying against the manufacturer's server is trusting them. On Solana the record is public: anyone reads it in a block explorer and checks it against the manufacturer's public wallet, without our site being involved at all.
Because every individual part becomes its own token, and that only works where minting costs close to nothing. Compressed NFTs make a passport per unit economically viable down to a R$200 shock absorber. On most other networks the issuance cost alone rules out anything but luxury goods.
No. They hold the phone near the part, the browser opens on its own, and the answer appears. No install, no account, no wallet. The chain is underneath, not in front.
The screen says we could not verify it — never that it is counterfeit. A damaged tag and a fake tag look identical to software, and accusing a legitimate buyer of holding a fake is a worse failure than saying we don't know. From there we send them to the manufacturer's official channel.
Nothing has shipped. The chips are renders and the transactions are on devnet while we build. We publish progress as it happens rather than after — what's on the site is the state of the work, not a promise about it.